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Is the objective passage of time compatible with relativistic physics?ere are
two easy routes to an armative answer: (1) provide a deationary analysis
of passage compatible with the block universe or (2) argue that a privileged
global present is compatible with relativity. (1) does not take passage seriously.
(2) does not take relativity seriously.is paper is concerned with the viability
of views that seek to take both passage and relativity seriously. e investi-
gation proceeds by considering how traditional A-theoretic conceptions of
passage might be generalised to relativistic spacetimes without incorporating
a privileged global present. I argue that the most promising position marries
the idea that open possibilities for the future are settled as time passes with a
‘non-standard’ interpretation of the relevant formal models.
I
e Project. is paper is concerned with the viability of a metaphysics of time
that is both properly relativistic and which vindicates the objective passage of time.
‘Properly relativistic’ will be explained shortly. First, some remarks about what I
take the objective passage of time to involve.
Time’s alleged passage is notoriously dicult to pin down.ere is, however, a
rather straightforward idea that, if not fully capturing what is meant by the passing
of time, is at least centrally associated with it. It gures prominently in the writing of
both critics and fans of passage, including those of Arthur Prior, whose account of
passage I review below. A perhaps more surprising recent source is the philosopher
of physics John Norton, who writes:
Time passes. Nothing fancy is meant by that. It is just the mundane fact
known to us all that future events will become present and then dri o
∗is is a dra of a Paper to be published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Please cite
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into the past. . .Time really passes. . .Our sense of passage is our largely
passive experience of a fact about the way time truly is, objectively.e
fact of passage obtains independently of us. (Norton 2010, p. 24)1
ere are two things to take away from this quotation. e rst is that the
passage of time involves what Prior (1968, pp. 1–2) called the ‘becoming ever more
past’ of events: future events ‘become present’ and then ‘dri o into the past.’e
second is that this change in the degree of pastness of events is supposed not to
be merely a function of our (changing) perspective on reality: it is a feature of the
way ‘time truly is. . . independently of us.’ When I write of real or objective passage, I
intend to highlight the second of these features.
So understood, the passage of time conicts with relativistic physics. Responses
to this conict are usefully categorised in terms of attitudes to two alleged entail-
ments.e rst of these is that relativistic physics implies a ‘B-theoretic’ or ‘block
universe’ view of time.e second is that the Beory of time implies that there is
no objective temporal passage. In these terms, there are three options open to the
defender of real passage: reject relativity; or reject one of the two alleged entailments.
is paper explores the option of denying the rst supposed entailment, that is,
denying that accepting relativity commits one to the block universe. Within this
option there is a further, important distinction to be drawn. By far the most popular
way to seek to reconcile relativity with an A-theoretic2 view of time involves arguing
that a privileged, spatially global present is compatible with relativity. My topic,
in contrast, is the possibility of a ‘properly relativistic’ A-theoretic view that fully
respects the symmetries of relativistic spacetime. Such a view will eschew a global
Now.
Why seek aer such a view? In the next section I summarise the Beory, and
endorse the second entailment; accepting the Beory does commit one to denying
that the ‘becomingmore past’ of events is an objective feature of reality.is puts the
Beory in prima facie conict with our ordinary, pre-theoretic conception of time,
according to which the passage of time is a real, mind-independent phenomenon. I
rmly believe that the B theorist can account for our mistaken belief that time really
passes, but I also believe that a fully satisfactory explanation of the required type
has yet to be given.3is motivates exploring whether the passage of time might,
1For similar descriptions by critics of passage, see, e.g., Smart (1949, p. 483) and Olson (2009).
2I am using the term ‘A-theoretic’ as a convenient label for any view of time according to which
there is more to time than is captured by the B theorist’s block universe.
3e parochial nature of our multiple, temporally-ordered perspectives on reality should feature
centrally in any such story, as should the relationship between the causal and temporal structure
of the world. Eorts by B theorists to account for our sense that time passes have been many and
varied; see, for example, Grünbaum (1967); Mellor (2001); Falk (2003); Ismael (2011); Dainton (2011);
Paul (2010); Prosser (2012); Deng (2013b). I side with Ismael and Deng, against Paul and Prosser, in
that I do not believe that our mistaken view that time passes has its roots in experiential illusion.
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aer all, be compatible with relativity.
e investigation in the rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Aer discussion
of the Beory, four sections review non-relativistic views that seek to vindicate
objective temporal passage. I start with presentism, for a grasp of how this view
incorporates temporal passage is key to understanding the claims of the Moving
Spotlight and the Growing Block theories, discussed next. I then consider what
I call, following Fine (2005), ‘non-standard’ Aeories, before turning to views
that link the passage of time to the idea that the future is open. is reasonably
extensive survey provides the tools needed to identify an alternative to the Beory
that is properly relativistic. Relativistic generalisations of the Moving Spotlight view
and the Growing Block view have recently been considered by Skow (2009) and by
Earman (2008) respectively. Reviewing their eorts paves the way for consideration
of ‘non-standard’ relativistic generalisations of views that link passage to the open
future.
Finally, it is important to distinguish formal models from how these models are
supposed to express the central commitments of the defender of real passage. In
these terms, generalisation of A-theoretic views to relativity involves two stages: (1)
identifying relativistic analogues of the classical models; and (2) explaining how
such models articulate a non-B-theoretic view of time.e rst step is relatively
straightforward, and generically involves replacing a structure of totally ordered
elements (intended, for example, to represent the tensed facts that hold as of some
time) with a structure whose elements are only partially ordered.e harder task is
to generalise to relativity the kind of stories that can be told about the pre-relativistic
models.
II
Time Does not Pass in the Block Universe. As I am using the label, the Beory of
time can be characterised via the following question:
Is an exhaustive catalogue of which events occur, and how they are
temporally related, a complete account of temporal reality?
I dene the B theorist as someone who answers this question in the armative.e
imagined exhaustive description of the temporal relatedness of events is assumed
to be tenseless: holding once and for all, from no temporal point of view. e
fundamental temporal relations in question are those of the ‘B series’: relations of
temporal precedence and, perhaps, temporal distance (duration).
e view is best elucidated via key spatial analogies. A description of reality
that includes the spatial disposition of all objects and events relative to one another
Rather, it involves a mistaken way of thinking about experience that is in itself veridical.
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(‘object a is ve metres from object b, in the direction dened by the line joining
objects c and d’ etc.) leaves nothing out, spatially speaking.4 One does not need to
further specify that object a is here, or twenty metres to the le. Such information
simply serves to locate objects spatially relative to ourselves, and (barring improbable
symmetries) is anyway deducible: if the view-from-nowhere characterisation of
reality is really complete, then one can in principle locate oneself spatially, and
determine one’s orientation in the world so described.
e B theorist likewise holds that to provide a complete account of temporal
reality one does not need to specify which events are occurring now. Consider, for
example, the present-tensed claim that you are reading.is is a true claim—you
are, in fact, reading now. But it is also a fact that (as I write this) it is cloudy, i.e.,
cloudy here.e B theorist claims that such facts are strictly analogous.eir truth
merely reects our spatiotemporal perspective. Just as the fact that it is cloudy here
is to be understood in terms of the spatially non-indexical fact that it is (on the
relevant date) overcast at a latitude of 32.9°N and a longitude of 117.2°W, so too the
fact that you are (now) reading is to be understood in terms of the tenseless claim
that you are (in the tenseless sense of ‘are’) reading at . . .on . . . (look at your watch,
and ll in the blanks).
On this picture, all times are on a par, fundamentally speaking. Consider the
obvious spatial parallel. Almost no one believes that any particular spatial location
is metaphysically privileged. Spatial places dier in all sorts of ways. One part of
space currently contains me; another similarly-shaped part is completely lled with
a portion of the Pacic Ocean. But these dierences do not make any particular
place special in the relevant metaphysical sense. Fundamentally speaking, they are
all an equal part of reality. In particular, our immediate spatial location, the spatial
analogue of the present time, is not metaphysically special, whether by virtue of the
possession of some peculiar property or otherwise. Similarly, the B theorist does
not regard the current time as in any way metaphysically privileged.
Since I am concerned with the compatibility of various views with relativistic
physics, I should note that these time/space analogies involve relativistically suspect
notions, namely, times and spatial places. According to relativity, at a fundamental
level there simply are no such things. But note that my original characterisation of
the Beory, via an armative answer to the question at the start of this section,
is not similarly problematic. Moreover, the relativistic generalisation of the claims
of the preceding paragraphs is straightforward. It is the thesis that, fundamentally
speaking, all regions of spacetime are on a par, regardless of the particularities of
their extension in spatial, temporal and null directions.5 e core of arguments
4Spatial points might be amongst the objects in question, so this characterisation is neutral
between substantivalist and relationalist views of space.
5Eliminating time talk in order to provide a relativistically acceptable statement of the Beory
might be straightforward, but it leaves a substantive task for the relativistic B theorist to address. Even
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from relativity to the Beory is that the classical A-theoretic alternatives to the
block universe do not generalise in this straightforward way.
is sketch of the B theory should have made it clear that the view implies that
there is no objective passage of time. Relatively recently, however, several authors
have insisted that time passes according to the Beory, even independently of the
perspectives of subjects embedded within time.6 Dieks (2006), for example, equates
‘temporal becoming’ with the (non-perspectival) ‘successive coming into being of
events.’is sounds like it should be incompatible with the Beory, according to
which all events tenselessly exist, each at their particular spatiotemporal location.
e block universe undergoes no change, so how can some part of it ‘come into
being’? Doesn’t that require a change in the block, from a state in which it did not
have that event as a part, to a state in which it does? Dieks, however, is not proposing
any such thing. Instead, he holds that an event’s coming into being is simply its
happening (‘what other coming into being could there be?’). He then notes that:
Since everything that happens is recorded in the block universe diagram,
‘coming into being’ is also fully represented. . .is proposal boils down
to a deationary analysis of becoming: becoming is nothing but the
happening of events, in their temporal order. (Dieks 2006, pp. 170–1)
If one wishes to label the successive occurrence of events ‘temporal passage’ then,
yes, time passes according to the Beory. John Earman rightly labels this a ‘thin
and yawn-inducing’ sense of passage (Earman 2008, p. 159). Its advocates seem
to be making heavy weather of facts that (almost) no one has ever denied. Worse
than this, though, their claim to have successfully identied temporal passage in
the block universe risks diverting attention from the key challenge that the B theory
faces, namely, that of providing a B-theoretic explanation of why we are inclined to
take the ‘becoming more past’ of events as an objective feature of reality. From here
on in, the focus is on views that seek to vindicate this sense of passage, rather than,
as the B-theorist must, explain it away.
those who do not take tense metaphysically seriously need to give an account of the truth conditions
for tensed language (and of our ordinary talk of times) as used in a world that, fundamentally, does
not contain times (see, e.g., Gibson and Pooley 2006, pp. 165–7).
6I have in mind, in particular, Dorato (2006), Savitt (2002) and Dieks (2006). Because they
do not all self-identify as B theorists, perhaps because they are sceptical that there is a substantive
dispute between A and B theorists, they might not characterise their eorts as arguing for the reality
of passage on the Beory. I should also mention Maudlin (2002; 2007, ch. 4), who styles himself as
a defender of the block universe and yet believes in the objective passage of time in a more robust
sense than allowed by Dieks et al. Whether he counts as a B-theorist in the sense of this section is not
straightforward.e fact the he is a realist (and primitivist) about the passage of time suggests that
he should view a description only of the temporal relatedness of all events as incomplete. However,
he might also deny that it makes sense to say that one event stands in (e.g.) the ‘earlier than’ relation
to another unless time passes (in his sense). I do not claim to understand Maudlin’s view.
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III
Presentism and the Passage of Time. Presentism is sometimes informally charac-
terised as the view that only the present time exists.7 It is true that the presentist,
unlike the B theorist, does not believe that past and future times are distant parts
of concrete reality. But this is not because they believe in the existence of only one
of the B theorist’s many times, a single 3-dimensional slice of the B theorist’s block.
According to the presentist, the material world is extended in only three spatial
dimensions, and not extended in a temporal dimension.e world is not naturally
characterised as the present time. A better characterisation of presentism starts with
the observation that, for the presentist, truth simpliciter is tensed. Truth simpliciter
is just what is presently true.e present truth about our three-dimensional world
exhaustively characterises reality, and this includes how it was and how it will be, as
well as how it presently is.
For the presentist, tensed facts are not reducible to how things tenselessly are
at dierent parts of a temporally extended reality. In fact, the presentist holds that
the opposite is true. How things ‘tenselessly’ are at past and future times is to be
analysed in terms of present, tensed truth. Times, including the present, are logical
constructs that allow for an elegant representation of the fundamental, tensed facts.
With presentist times so understood, we are at liberty to use time talk again.8 It
follows that the block universe model, supplemented with an indication of which
three dimensional subregion is the present (together, perhaps, with a future-pointing
arrow), exactly encodes the presentist’s commitments. One need only be careful not
to misinterpret dierent parts of the block as corresponding to dierent parts of
a tenselessly existing concrete reality. Instead they collectively represent all that is
happening, has happened or will happen.
A natural thought at this point is that something crucial is still missing from
the model. In what sense does it capture the passage of time? Doesn’t the model
need continual updating? Doesn’t the region of the block representing the present
need to move up the block, in the direction of the arrow? Perhaps the single block
needs to be replaced by uncountably many copies, each with the present dierently
located, each representing the dierent sets of tensed facts that hold as time passes.
Here is how Kit Fine expresses the worry:
e passage of time requires that the moments of time be successively
present and this appears to require more than the presentness of a
single moment of time.e [presentist] at this point might appeal to
7A popular alternative, also in terms of existence, involves claims such as: necessarily, it is always
true that only present objects exist (see, e.g., Markosian 2004).e characterisation of presentism
advocated in the main text is intended to be compatible with this claim.
8A popular presentist move identies times with maximal propositions of a certain kind. My
characterisation of presentism is intended to be compatible with this ploy.
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the fact that any particular future time t+ will be present and that any
particular past time t− was present. However, the future presentness of
t+ amounts to no more than t being present and t+ being later than t. . .
We naturally read more into the [presentist]’s tense-logical pronounce-
ments than they actually convey. But his conception of temporal reality,
once it is seen for what it is, is as static or block-like as the [B theorist]’s,
the only dierence lying in the fact that his block has a privileged centre.
(Fine 2005, p. 287)
e worry is misplaced, as a review of Prior’s account of presentist passage reveals.
Prior unpacks his rst-pass characterisation of the passage of time, as the be-
coming ever more past of events, in tense-theoretic terms. Part of his story involves
an eliminativism about events. Consider the recession into the past of Prior’s falling
out of a punt. According to Prior, to say that this event has so far receded 57 years
into the past is to say nothing more than that Prior fell from a punt 57 years ago.
Or, in semi-regimented language using metric tense-operators, WAS57y(Prior is
falling out of a punt).9 Prior contends that this last sentence is not about any objects
except him and the punt from which he fell: ‘there is no real reason to believe in the
existence either now or [57] years ago of a further object called “my falling out of a
punt”’ (Prior 1968, p. 10).
So far we have only considered how the Priorian presentist analyses apparent
talk of events and their current pastness, or futurity. What about the changes in
pastness and futurity that are constitutive of time’s passage? Consider, again, Prior’s
fall from a punt. It was, just a year ago, only 56 years in the past. It is now no longer
only 56 years in the past. In another year, it will be the case that Prior fell from a
punt 58 years previously: the event will have receded a further year into the past.
Letting ‘P’ stand for ‘Prior is falling out of a punt,’ in Prior’s operator-theoretic
regimentation, one has:
WAS1y(WAS56y(P)) ∧ ¬WAS56y(P) ∧WAS57y(P) ∧WILL1y(WAS58y(P)). (1)
Can tense-theoretic claims like this really be all that the presentist needs to
express the passage of time? Two reections might help to assuage doubts. First,
compare these tensed claims to the presentist’s expression of everyday changes
in ordinary objects, for example, my change in shape as I go from standing to
sitting. For the presentist, this amounts to the fact that I am now sitting but that I
was, a moment ago, standing, and so not sitting. In other words, change involves
conjunctions of the form P∧WASn(¬P). But, with a little redenition, this is exactly
what we have in the rst two conjuncts in (1).e combination of the tensed facts
(i) that I was standing but (ii) that I am not now standing amounts to real, objective
9‘WAS57y(P)’ is to be read as ‘It was the case 57 years ago that P’ etc.
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change. Why should the same not be true of the combination of the tensed facts (i)
that Prior’s falling was 56 years ago and (ii) that this falling is not now 56 years ago?
e second reection is this. If this second conjunction is genuine change, what
kind of change is it? What is changing? We have seen that, for Prior, it is not the
event of his falling, rather it is Prior himself.10 Now, going from being such that one
fell 56 years ago, to being such that one fell 57 years ago might seem to be a very
anaemic kind of change. But this is exactly what one wants! It is exactly the change
that is due to no more than time’s passing. All robust intrinsic change could cease
but, the defender of real passage thinks, things would continue to change merely by
becoming older, for time continues to pass.
Let us return to Fine’s charge that presentism is as static and block-like as the
Beory. One way to put the worry is that a block with a privileged centre represents
only a proper sub-collection of the full set of tensed truths that obtain over time, as
time passes. We have seen, however, that this set of present truths expresses genuine
change. And, while some of these truths (like the facts that I’m now sitting but that
I was standing) concern ordinary change in ordinary objects, others express the
very change we are concerned with, namely, change in what is true.e present,
tensed facts include, for example, facts to the eect that certain tensed propositions
are not now true but that they were or will be true.11 One simply cannot accept all
the present, tensed truths without accepting that what is true undergoes genuine
change.
Deng (2013a, pp. 29–31) provides a sympathetic application of Fine’s criticism
to presentist accounts of passage of the kind considered here. Her conclusion is
not that time does not pass according to presentism, but that presentism is no
better at capturing passage than the Beory. However, what we have seen is
that presentism vindicates, (i) events objectively becoming ever more past, (ii) an
absolutely privileged time and (iii) genuine change in which time is privileged.
Together these correspond to a sense in which there is real passage of a kind that is
(rightly!) missing from the Beory.
IV
e Moving Spotlight and the Growing Block. eMoving Spotlight and the Growing
10Save for the fact that he no longer exists. How to treat apparently singular propositions about
things that no longer exist is a well known problem for presentism, but it is not per se a problem for
their account of passage. Realistically, at any time there will always be numerous persisting things
then existing to which passage-related change can be ascribed. But even in a maximally evanescent
world that lacks persisting entities, one still has combinations of the formWAS(∃xFx) ∧ ¬Fx. For
Prior, this ‘quasi change’ (which does not require a presently existing entity that once was F but is so
no longer) is sucient for passage.
11See Markosian (2004, p. 78) for a Prior-like cashing out of passage in closely related terms.
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Block views agree with the Beory, against presentism, that past (and in the case of
the Moving Spotlight view, future) times are as much a part of concrete reality as the
present moment.ey disagree with the Beory in denying that a once-and-for-
all description of the temporal relatedness of all parts of this temporally extended
reality constitutes a complete account of time.ese similarities justify discussing
both theories together, for their main problems stem from this shared combination
of commitments. I focus primarily on the Moving Spotlight view; some of the
peculiarities of the Growing Block are discussed at the end of the section.
In a paper concerned with its potential relativistic generalisation, Brad Skow
provides this nice summary of the Moving Spotlight theory:
e theory combines eternalism—the doctrine that past, present, and
future times all exist—with “objective becoming.”e claim that there
is objective becoming has two parts. First, facts about which time
is present are nonrelative. at is, even if in some sense each time
is present relative to itself, only one time is absolutely present. . .And
second, which instant is absolutely present keeps changing.e NOW
moves along the series of times from earlier times to later times. (Skow
2009, p. 666)
Clearly the claim that the NOWmoves along the time series is central to the
view’s vindication of temporal passage. What sense can be made of it? A familiar
‘two times’ objection rears its head.12 Movement is just change in location in some
space with respect to time. But since the movement in question is that of the
NOW’s position in time, it seems that one needs to postulate an additional temporal
dimension—supertime—with respect to which the NOW’s position in ordinary time
can be said to change.e smooth movement of the NOW, from past to future, is
cashed out as the fact that, from the perspectives of ever Later13 supertimes, the
NOW is located at ever later times.
Skow thinks that the supertime picture is a useful aid to grasping the content
of the theory rather than a reductio of it. He also insists that supertime is strictly a
ction. His ocial story is spelled out in terms of primitive tense operators: ‘If it is
NOW time t, then to say that the NOWmoves from the past to the future is to say
that it was the case that a time before t was NOW, and it will be the case that a time
aer t [will be] NOW’ (Skow 2009, p. 668). Our review of presentism allows us to
see that this move indeed gives us genuine change in which time is NOW. Moreover
it is a type of change that can be combined with there being an absolute fact about
which time is NOW.
12See, e.g., Broad (1923, p. 65) and, for the classic exposition, Smart (1949).
13I follow Skow’s convention of distinguishing relations that order supertimes from those that
order ordinary times by capitalising terms for the former.
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So far, so good, but now consider how the ocial tense-theoretic story and
the supertime metaphor are related. Suppose, again, that it is NOW time t and let
how things are from the perspective of supertime T correspond to how things are
simpliciter. What does it mean to say that WAS(a time earlier than t is NOW)? Skow
suggests that this corresponds to the supertime claim that, from the perspective of
some supertime T ′ Earlier than T , some time t′ earlier than t is NOW.14is might
surprise someone familiar with typical model-theoretic treatments of tense logic.
Aer all, the meanings of tense operators are normally related to what is the case at
ordinary times, not to what is the case at dierent points in supertime. But Skow is
absolutely right to set things up as he does. It is the Moving Spotlighter’s points of
supertime, not the ‘ordinary’ times that they postulate as distinct parts of concrete
reality, that play the role that ordinary times play for the presentist.
is points to a deeply problematic feature of the view, at least in this version.
For the Moving Spotlighter, the eternalist thesis that past and future times exist on
a par with the present is a tensed claim. ‘Eternalism’ is therefore apt, for the view
involves the eternal persistence, in the presentist’s sense of persistence, of all these
times.ey are taken to (always) be concrete parts of a (persisting) 4-dimensional
reality.is reality changes (in the presentist’s sense of change), but only by virtue
of changes in which part of concrete reality is absolutely present.
Appeal to primitive tense does not, aer all, avoid the two times problem.ere
are two times, it is just that one (ordinary time) is B-theoretic and the other (su-
pertime) is A-theoretic. On the picture of reality being oered, I exist (some-
how or other) at many ‘temporal’ locations along a thin tube-like region of a four-
dimensional block and, moreover, I always was so located and will always continue
to be so. I would like to think that I (or some temporal part of me) is located in
a subregion of the block that is absolutely present. I would also like to think this
privileged location is where I am typing this sentence. But with what right do I
assume either of these things?15e Moving Spotlight theory is not a plausible view.
It succeeds, like presentism, in securing an absolute yet changing fact of the matter
about which time is present. In this context, however, its commitment to the equal
reality of past and future times is a aw not a feature.
I conclude this section with a few remarks the Growing Block theory. Prior’s
‘becoming more past’ covers, as well movement from the near past to the far past,
movement from the far future to the near future, and from the near future to the
present. Unlike theMoving Spotlighter, the Growing Blocker treats these transitions
very dierently.
e central primitive notion of the theory corresponds to an event’s passage
14Such supertime truth conditions for tensed statements are not meant as an analysis of tense.
Rather, such claims are supposed to explicate supertime talk in terms of primitive tense.
15ere is now a small literature on this ‘how do I know that it is NOW now?’ objection, originally
pressed by Bourne (2002) and Braddon-Mitchell (2004).
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from the future to the present. According to Broad (1923), an event’s becoming
present is exactly its coming into existence. Before it comes into being, the event
simply does not exist.is means that, on the theory, there is no literal passage of
events in the far future to the nearer future, for there are no future events around
whose degree of futurity can be said to be changing. What about an event’s passage
from the present to the past? Broad held it to be a genuine change, but not one
involving any intrinsic change in the event, and nor any change in the relations
that the event bears to given other events. Rather, the change is constituted by the
coming into existence of new events, to which the now past event thereby comes to
be related. In Broad’s words: ‘Nothing has happened to the present by becoming
past except that fresh slices of existence have been added to the total history of the
world.e past is thus as real as the present’ (Broad 1923, p. 66).
is last quotation highlights two aspects of the picture that deserve emphasis.
First, unlike on the Moving Spotlight view, past times are held to be on a par with
the present, ontologically and metaphysically.e present is distinguished only by
its being the ‘edge’ of reality: the time beyond which there are no further times.
Second, since the sum total of reality is forever increasing via becoming, the time
slices of the Growing Block, just like the times of the Moving Spotlight view, persist.
In fact, Broad seems to acknowledge this explicitly. He writes: ‘there is no such
thing as ceasing to exist; what has become exists henceforth for ever’ (Broad 1923,
p. 69, second emphasis mine).
e parallels with the Moving Spotlight theory are clear. e natural way to
make sense of talk of the Block’s growth in a way that avoids commitment to the
existence of the points of a second time dimension is in terms of primitive tense.
ere is an absolute fact about the extent of the sum total of reality, but this fact
changes.e sum total of reality was smaller; it will be larger. As with the Moving
Spotlight theory, this manoeuvre does not avoid the postulation of two times. Just
as in that case, we have one B-theoretic (truncated, but growing) dimension, and
one A-theoretic ‘dimension’. And as before, the picture appears to be guilty of
‘spatializing’ the former as a persisting dimension that, on closer analysis, does not
connect directly with our ordinary tensed talk. Spelling out the growth of the block
in terms of primitive tense gives rise to a coherent view, but it is one that is no more
plausible than the Moving Spotlight view, for precisely parallel reasons.
V
Non-standard Aeories. On the views so far considered there are supposed be
absolute facts of the matter about the way the world is. For the B theorist, the
absolute facts concern how the world is from no temporal point of view. For the
presentist, the absolute facts concern how the world is presently (understood to
include how it was and how it will be). According to the Moving Spotlighter, there
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is an absolute fact about which of the many existent times is NOW. Non-standard
Aeories give up the idea that there are absolute facts of the matter about the way
the world is.e resulting views resemble the Beory in that they deny that any
one time is absolutely privileged; they depart from the Beory in upholding the
non-reducibility of tense.
One route to such a non-standard A theory starts with the presentist view
discussed above.16 e presentist takes the present facts to be the absolute facts.
ey postulated no other facts, but in terms of the present facts, they are able to
say what the facts have been and what they are going to be. On the corresponding
non-standard view, the facts that the presentist takes as absolute are reinterpreted
as holding only relative to some particular time. Further, what facts hold relative
to past and future times is not taken to be reducible to what was and what will be
the case simpliciter.e world is one way relative to one time; it is some other way
relative to another time.ere is no truth simpliciter to be had. Truth is taken to be
essentially relative to times.e present time only counts as the present relative to
the tensed facts we started with, the facts that hold relative to it. Every other time is
equally present, relative to its own special collection of tensed facts.
Do non-standard views vindicate the passage of time?e rst, obvious, point
to make is that everything the presentist said was true absolutely remains true
relative to a particular temporal perspective. And everything that the presentist
maintained was always true remains true relative to every temporal perspective.
Since time passes according to the presentist, the same holds true, as of any time,
on the non-standard view. One of the view’s many perspectives is supposed to be
our perspective so we can truly say (now) that time passes.
is is to consider how things are from the perspective of each time. One might
also consider how things vary across perspectives. Consider rst the analogous
variation in the Beory, which can then serve as a useful contrast to the variation
involved in non-standardA theories. On the Beory, events do not literally become
ever more past. But nevertheless one can consider the perspectives of a sequence
of ever later times. In a sense, one can say of any given event that it becomes ever
more past relative to such a sequence. But on the Beory, all this amounts to is
that the event is located at an ever greater temporal distance from each time in the
sequence.is no more corresponds to the real passage of time than the analogous
spatial truth that, relative to a sequence of locations ordered continuously by their
mutual spatial distances, the rst element of the sequence is an ever greater spatial
distance from each subsequent member of the sequence.
Similarly, on the Beory there is a sense in which each time counts as the
present relative to itself. So even on the Beory, ‘the present’ can be said to change
16I take the result to correspond to Fine’s ‘external relativist’ version of non-standard realism
about tense; see Fine (2005, pp. 278–80).
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its position in time, relative to time. But again, the B-theoretic sense in which a time
is present to itself is exactly analogous to the sense in which each spatial location
counts as ‘here’ relative to itself. Being the centre of a perspectival representation is
not per se to be represented as special by that representation. In fact, this seems to
be a plausible way to think about the spatial origin of our visual representation of
space. In one sense, vision represents our location dierently from the other spatial
locations that it represents.17 But in another sense, even in visual experience, our
spatial location is not represented as privileged. It is presented visually merely as the
spatial location at which we happen to be. We understand the perspectival nature of
our visual relationship to other places precisely in terms of our spatial relationship
to those places. Moreover, our being so related to them is something that is itself
represented in our spatially perspectival representation.
Consider, now, the analogous variations on the non-standard view. As one
considers ever later temporal perspectives, a given event does, literally, become ever
more past. Similarly, as one considers ever later perspectives, later and later times
are distinguished as the present in a way that goes beyond the B-theoretic variation
just reviewed.e way in which the tensed facts true relative to a particular time
single out that time is supposed not to be reducible to tenseless relational facts
about, e.g., the various B relations which events stand in to that time, so a fortiori
the tensed facts cannot be facts about those relations.
Does this variation with temporal perspective provide us with a sense in which
the non-standard view vindicates the passage of time?ere is an apparent problem
with the suggestion that it does.e variation is not itself a fact about how reality
is. Our model of the view includes such variation but, as we saw earlier, features
of the model that transcend what is true from each temporal perspective do not
correspond to perspective-independent facts about reality.ere are meant to be
no such facts.18is issue recurs in the context of open future models of passage,
so I postpone further discussion until the next section.
VI
Passage and the Open Future. So far I have assumed that vindicating the passage of
time involves outlining a metaphysics according to which the becoming more past
of events is a mind-independent, objective phenomenon.ere is, however, another
set of ideas that are naturally associated with the belief that time really passes.
e basic idea is crisply summarised by the cosmologist George Ellis:
17In some sense it is not represented at all except as a limit.
18A type of surrogate can be recovered in terms of time-relative facts. As of any time, I can
consider what will be true from a sequence of ever later perspectives. And I can iterate this procedure
by considering, for example, from the perspective of t1 what is true, from the perspective of some
earlier or later time t2, about temporal perspectives ever later than t2.
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ings could have been dierent, but second by second, one specic
evolutionary history out of all the possibilities is chosen, takes place,
and gets cast in stone. (Ellis 2006, 1812–3)
e viewhas two essential elements. First, there is the idea that the future is genuinely
open: at any instant, there are several possible ways that the world might develop.
Second, there is the idea that only one of these possibilities in fact happens: as time
passes, exactly one of the many possibilities becomes actuality, and the rest become
mere might-have-beens.
In order to pin down the view, one needs to clear about what is meant by the
claim that the future is open.19 Suppose that the laws of nature are indeterministic
in the sense that specication of the world’s history up to a certain time, together
with those laws, does not x all future facts.20 To say that the future is open might
only be to say that the future is not nomologically determined in this sense. But
that the past and present, together with the laws, do not x all future facts does not
entail that there are no such facts. In tenseless terms, there can be a unique actual
continuation of the world to the future of some time t, but this continuation need
not be the only one compatible with the actual laws and the way the world is up to
and including t.
Several advocates of the open future (e.g., Geach 1973; McCall 1976; Barnes
and Cameron 2011) claim that true openness requires, not just that the future not
be (nomologically) determined, but that it also be not fully determinate. And one
popular way of cashing out what lack of determinateness means focuses on the
status of future possibilities. When one hasmere nomological openness of the future,
there are, as of a time, many possible futures compatible with the indeterministic
laws, but they are not all created equal. One amongst them corresponds to the actual
future.e others are therefore ways the actual worldmight have been (consistent
with its past and the laws), but not ways that it genuinelymight still be. For example,
it cannot both be true that there will not be a sea battle tomorrow but that there
might be one (in the relevant, non-epistemic sense of might). e open future
view now under consideration, therefore, insists that, for them all to be genuine
possibilities, none from amongst them is now singled out as what will take place.21
is leads naturally to ‘branching time’ models of reality: tree-like structures, the
nodes of which correspond to spatially global instants.e branches are intended
to represent the plurality of possibilities to the future of each of the nodes from
which they branch.
19For a more comprehensive review of the options, see Torre (2011).
20e relevant sense of determinism is the model-theoretic one pioneered by Montague and
rened and deployed by Lewis (1983) and Earman (1986).
21MacFarlane (2003, pp. 325–6) oers an argument of this kind against views that seek to uphold
the bivalence of future contingents. For criticism, see Torre (2011, pp. 366-7).
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Given such a structure, there are many ways to construct semantics for tensed
(andmodal) sentences relative to the structure’s instants.e optionsmost in accord
with the intuitions that led us to this point are the ones that involve a failure of
bivalence for future contingents. Suppose, that, as of now, it is an open possibility
whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow: in some possible futures such a battle
occurs, in others it does not. In such circumstances, the semantics should secure
the truth of both of the following:
• ere might be a sea battle tomorrow
• ere might not be a sea battle tomorrow.
One might also reason that, whichever open possibility comes to pass, either there
will be such a battle or there won’t be.at is,
• Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or there won’t be
should also come out as true. However, since it is supposed to be genuinely unsettled,
as of now, whether there will be a sea battle, neither of the following claims should
count as true:
• ere will be a sea battle tomorrow
• ere will not be a sea battle tomorrow.
For similar reasons, it seems that neither should count as false either.e fact that
it is not now settled that tomorrow there will not be a sea battle, for example, can be
taken to be a reason for denying that ‘there will be a sea battle tomorrow’ is plain
false. It turns out that there are relatively natural semantics for branching time that
secure exactly these results.22
ere is a popular line of argument against the branching-time model of the
open future.e basic idea of the objection is that there is nothing unsettled about
a branching reality. An omniscient being located at one of the nodes with branching
to their future, should not be uncertain about, or think it unsettled whether, there
will be a sea battle.ere will be such a battle, for there is such a battle in at least
one of the future branches.ere are also future branches in which there won’t be
such a battle. If the claim ‘`the future contains a sea battle’ does not come out as true
(and is also not false), this is only because of a presupposition failure. ‘e future’
fails to refer because there are several futures (see, e.g., Lewis 1986, pp. 207–9).
e objection presupposes a B-theoretic interpretation of branching-time mod-
els, in which the block universe is replaced by a ‘block multiverse.’ Whether such a
22e most well known are the supervaluationist semantics rst proposed byomason (1970).
For recent discussion, see Brogaard (2008), MacFarlane (2008), and, for an application of such
semantics in the context of the Growing Block view, Briggs and Forbes (2012).
15
picture vindicates the intuition that the future is open is controversial. Many agree
with Lewis that it does not.23 e A-theorist, however, need not worry how this
dispute is resolved, for, from their perspective, the objection gets things back-to-
front. On the view we are exploring one starts with the intuition that, as of some
time, the future is open.is is taken to mean that (i) there are several ways that
thing might happen, and (ii) nothing in reality singles out (as of that time) one of
these possibilities as the way things will actually be. On the intended interpretation,
branching-time structures are introduced as a means to represent these purported
facts, and to see whether a consistent formal theory incorporating them can be
devised. Against this background, one is simply not permitted to reinterpret the
branches relative to some time as several equally real futures, rather than as several
equally real possible ways that the single future might turn out.24
It is time to confront an issue that has been lurking in the background. Recall
that the view summarised in the quotation from Ellis has two components. e
open future was the rst.e second was the idea that, as time passes, just one of the
several possibilities for each moment obtains. As of now, no future is distinguished
but, with the passage of time, onewill come to be. How is this idea to be incorporated
into branching-time models?
At one level, what is required would seem to be straightforward. A path through
a branching-time structure corresponds to a single determinate course of events.
For the open-future A theorist, such a path corresponds to a possible view from the
‘end of time’: a possible way for the entire history of the world to have unfolded. Pick
such a path through a given branching-time structure. Its linearly ordered instants
dene a linearly ordered sequence of subtrees of our original tree, with eachmember
of the sequence a proper substructure of the preceding ones. Each instant from the
chosen history is the privileged node of the corresponding subtree, where it features
as the rst instant of branching. With this machinery in place, the natural thought is
23e block multiverse picture was once routinely associated with the Everettian interpretation
of quantum mechanics (EQM). Something like the Lewis objection lies behind the argument in
Greaves (2004) that there can be no ‘subjective uncertainty’ in an Everettian world. Recently, there
has been a subtle shi in the position of some advocates of subjective uncertainty in EQM. It is now
claimed that the theory’s fundamental ontology is equally consistent with a diverging (rather than
branching) picture of quasi-classical worlds, and that this picture is to be preferred for precisely the
kind of reasons alluded to above; see Saunders (2010) and Wilson (2011).
24Here are two possible sources of confusion. First, the defender of the open future is likely to
insist both that (a) ‘in reality’ there are ‘real’ future possibilities and that (b) these future possibilities
are all ‘equally’ real. As we have seen, the point of this insistence is to dierentiate the view from
advocacy of a merely nomologically open future. Second, the models represent all events in the
possible futures as temporally related to the instant from which they branch. But of course events
that might occur in the future are represented as temporally related to the present: if they occur, they
will be some temporal distance from the present. It does not follow from this (for the A-theorist)
that there (tenselessly) is both a sea battle 24 hours from now and (in some other realm of reality)
an absence of such a battle 24 hours from now.
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that the passage of time is to be represented, not within a single branching structure,
but by a sequence of the kind just described. As time passes, successive elements of
the sequence represent how reality is. Moving along the sequence corresponds to
tracing an upward path through the original tree. Moment aer moment, one of
the many possibilities for each successive time is chosen. But there always remains
branching to the future. No element of the sequence corresponds to the ‘view from
the end of time.’at exists only as the ideal limit of the sequence as a whole.25
Something very like this model of temporal passage has been defended by Storrs
McCall (1976; 1984; 1994).e picture is very suggestive, but it invites the by now
familiar two-times objection.26 Time seems to be doubly represented, rst by the
sequence of ever shrinking trees and then by the temporal dimension within each
tree.anks to our review of traditional Aeories, we are well placed to identify the
most plausible A-theoretic responses, and to note some new twists that modelling
the open future brings.
To my mind the least plausible option, which I take to be McCall’s view, is the
natural analogue of the Moving Spotlight and Growing Block views. As on the block
multiverse view, reality as a whole is a branching entity whose individual branches
are extended in four dimensions. As time passes, this reality changes. ‘Branch
attrition’ occurs as more and more parts of it go out of existence. As on the Moving
Spotlight view, future times are as real as past times. As on the Growing Block view,
the present time is metaphysically on a par with other times. It is distinguished only
in terms of its location relative to structurally denable features of reality. Rather
than being the bleeding edge, it is the surface at which branching begins.27
What sense can be made of branch attrition? As on standard versions of the
Growing Block and the Moving Spotlight, one can think of a single element of
the sequence as corresponding to how things are absolutely. Change in branching
is then understood in primitively tensed terms: other elements of the sequence
represent how things were, and how they will be.
is is not a route that the open-future A theorist should take. Prior to our
seeking to articulate the view in terms of an appropriate model, there seemed to
be no incompatibility between insisting that, as of now, it is unsettled, and hence
neither true nor false, that there will be a sea battle tomorrow, but that, as time
passes, things get settled one way or the other. A sequence of ever smaller branching
structures seems like an attempt to do justice to both features of the view.e parity
of the branches in each element of the sequence respects the rst; branch attrition
25Earman (2008) makes an analogous point concerning models of the Growing Block view.
26For related criticisms, see Nerlich (1998) and Farr (2012).
27is is to be faithful to McCall’s view, and to interpret distinct branches as distinct realms of
reality.ere is also a linear time interpretation involving branching only at the level of courses of
material events occurring within a four-dimensional block.e present time is then metaphysically
distinguished, as the frontier between determinateness and indeterminateness in reality.
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respects the second. However, we should reject the hybrid interpretation of the
model. Concrete reality does not branch.e branching structures are simply ways
of representing the particular pattern of tensed claims that the preferred semantics
for such structures generates.e open-future A theorist should take such tensed
claims as basic.
ere are two kinds of such a view to consider: an analogue (or version) of
presentism, and a non-standard view.e presentist variant claims that just one
element of the sequence corresponds to a complete catalogue of the absolute facts.
Strictly speaking, therefore, the other elements of the sequence cannot be required.
is mirrors our earlier claim that, when modelling the presentist view in terms of
a block universe with a privileged centre, one does not need additional blocks in
order to show that the privileged centre moves forward in time.is fact is already
encoded in the original block. Does this remain true once we have branching?
e key thing to note is that, while future elements of the sequence cannot be
read o from earlier elements, that the future facts will correspond to one such
element can. Amongst the tensed facts that a branching structure encodes is that
exactly one amongst the possibilities open at that time will occur. Here is one way
to visualise the point: while a given branching structure (absent a thin red line)
does not encode a single sequence of the kind we have been considering, it does
encode that the future tensed facts that hold at later and later times correspond
to some such sequence. Given that it is not now determined how things will turn
out, one might think that the lack of a preferred sequence is exactly as it should be.
Passage is accommodated in this model just as it is in standard presentism. But the
view adds the further feature that, as time passes, what once was unsettled becomes
settled: there might be a sea battle or there might not, and either there will be one
or there won’t.
e model of the non-standard variant of the view does involve a particular
sequence. Each element of it represents the irreducibly tensed facts that hold as
of some time. is might seem to give us a more explicit representation of once
open possibilities being settled by the passage of time: what is indeterminate as
of t is settled in such-and-such a way as of t′. But care is needed: the sequence of
trees does not represent how reality is absolutely, as conceived from no particular
temporal point of view.
Just as the tensed facts that hold as of some time are not reducible to tenseless
facts, there is no need for them to be deducible from the tensed facts that hold as of
other times. As of t, it is neither true nor false that there will be a sea battle at t′. As
of t′, it is true that a sea battle is raging.is seems to be exactly what one needs
if one is to capture the motivating idea with which we began this section. In fact,
for exactly this reason, it might seem that this open-future version of non-standard
A theory better captures the passage of time than a version in which the tensed facts
as of one time can be read o from those that hold at another. In the latter case,
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it is hard to see what the insistence that such facts are not reducible comes to, for
there is a unique representation of reality—the block universe—from which the
perspectival facts can be derived.is is no longer true of the open-future model.
e primordial branching-structure captures only how things might turn out, not
how they will turn out.e block universe history that constitutes the ideal limit of
the sequence of the model’s branching structures not only does not correspond to
the facts as of any time (the end of time is never reached), it also, when interpreted
as representing the absolute facts, misrepresents as determinate future facts that are
genuinely unsettled.
I therefore take the combination of objective temporal passage and the branching-
time conception of the open future to be a way that the A theorist can drive a wedge
between their view and the Beory. Of the various A-theoretic view surveyed up
to this point, I take presentism, and some variant of non-standard Aeory to be
the most attractive vehicles for this combination. In the face of relativity, only one
of these views remains a going concern.
VII
Against a Preferred Now. Global instants play a fundamental role in the Aeories
reviewed so far. Presentism takes the world to be extended in only three, spatial
dimensions. In order to interpret a spacetimemodel as a representation of presentist
reality, one needs to foliate it by a family of 3-dimensional instants and indicate
which corresponds to the current time. e Moving Spotlight view embraces a
4-dimensional reality, but singles out a 3-dimensional subregion as metaphysically
privileged. e Growing Block view’s 4-dimensional reality is truncated to the
future, bounded by a 3-dimensional, spatially extended surface.e nodes of the
branching-time models represent 3-dimensional, spatially extended global instants.
Minkowski spacetime, the spacetime of special relativity, lacks such structure.
While somemodels of general relativity come with physically preferred foliations
by sequences of 3-dimensional spacelike hypersurfaces, the physical characteristics
of such surfaces do not mark them out as obvious candidates for the privileged
surfaces of a classical picture of temporal passage.28 Moreover, the local physics
(which, presumably, is the physics in terms of which we should seek to understand
our temporal experience of the world) is as blind to these privileged surfaces as it is
in special relativity. In fact, the local physics just is the physics of special relativity.
In the face of these facts, there would seem to be three distinct routes by which
the passage of timemight be reconciled with relativistic physics.e rst, advocated,
for example, by Dieks (2006) and Savitt (2009), is to oer a deationary analysis of
28For a recent review of some of the obstacles to interpreting such foliations in presentist terms,
see Wüthrich (2013, §5).
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passage. As discussed in Section II, this simply ignores, rather than solves, the main
explanatory challenge faced by the Beory.
e second option is to argue that amodel of passage that requires a preferred set
of global Nows is compatible with relativity when the latter is correctly understood.29
Here is not the place to review the sizeable literature on this possibility, but I want to
highlight one cost of this route. Its advocates face a dilemma: either they interpret
the spatiotemporal structure of relativistic spacetime at face value, or they are
committed to spatiotemporal facts that go beyond this structure. Neither choice
looks attractive.
According to typical versions of the second choice, the spacetime metric system-
atically misrepresents the true spatial and temporal distances between events. But
it is the spatial and temporal distances of the spacetime metric that correspond to
the measurements of physical rods and clocks. One variant of the second choice,
for example, is the ‘neo-Lorentzian’ interpretation of special relativity. One can
represent the commitments of this view in two stages. One rst re-interprets the
standard spacetimemodels of some special relativistic physics in terms ofNewtonian
spacetime structure. One then interprets the Newtonian structure in terms of one’s
favourite classical A-theoretic metaphysics.30 On this picture, theMinkowski metric
systematically misrepresents the spatial and temporal distances between events.
For example, it might represent as some spatial distance apart and as standing in
no temporal relation two events that are, from the point of view of the postulated
Newtonian structure, some nite temporal distance apart and some other (deriva-
tive) spatial distance apart. It is, of course, the spatial and temporal distances of the
Minkowski metric, not those of the hidden Newtonian structure, that correspond
to the measurements of physical rods and clocks. Given this, it might seem prefer-
able to adopt a literalistic attitude to the spacetime metric and simple superadd a
metaphysically preferred foliation in terms of which passage is to be understood.
But this choice also has its costs.
Suppose, for example, that some momentary event e is presently occurring and
that some other event e′ will occur. Suppose that the Minkowski metric represents
the spatiotemporal distance between e and e′ as being, say, two minutes. Now
consider the set of events that will co-occur with e′ according to the superadded
29For a systematic defence of this option, see Zimmerman (2011, §4).
30It is perhaps worth emphasising that this does not require revisionary physics.e standard
geometrical machinery used to represent a Newtonian spacetime is an n-tuple (M , hab , ta , σ a ,∇).
hab is a tensor eld that denes the Euclidean spatial metric on simultaneity surfaces. ta is a one-form
eld that denes these surfaces and the temporal distances between them. σ a is a time-like vector
eld whose integral curves represent the worldlines of the points of absolute space. In terms of
these objects one can dene an eective (inverse) Minkowski metric gab ∶= σ aσ b − hab , which is
compatible with the derivative operator ∇.e ‘Newtonian’ representation of standard relativistic
physics then simply couples matter elds (such as the electromagnetic eld) to this object in the
standard way (see, e.g., Trautman 1966, pp. 419–421).
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foliation. Most of these will not occur twominutes aer e according to the spacetime
metric. Many will occur amuch shorter temporal distance aer e, for example, some
small fraction of a second.at might seem strange, but it is perhaps a consequence
that the A theorist can live with. Temporal distance, as measured by clocks and as
encoded by themetric, is no longer ameasure of a single distance between successive
sets of co-occurring events. In short, it is no longer a measure of the passage of
time.e situation, however, is worse than this. Not all events co-occurring with e′
happen some temporal distance aer e.ere will be many events co-occurring
with e′, much further from it spatially, that, according to the metric, occur some
spatial distance from e.at is, they happen aer e (according to the A theorist’s
conception of passage) but they lie at no temporal distance from e (including the
zero distance). e resulting view may not be incoherent, but it is very strange
indeed. We have seen enough tomotivate consideration of the third and nal option:
is it possible to generalise the models of the previous sections in order to obtain a
genuinely A-theoretic view that does without global nows?
Something like this task has been undertaken recently by Earman (2008), for
the Growing Block, and Skow (2009), for the Moving Spotlight. ese were the
views that looked least attractive in our review of classical models of passage, and
their shortcomings carry over to the relativistic domain. Nonetheless, it is worth
reviewing Earman’s and Skow’s eorts, for they can serve as a template for the
generalisation of the branching-time models.
VIII
e Relativistic Growing Block. In order to appreciate Earman’s generalisation of
Growing Block models to relativistic physics one rst needs to quickly rehearse his
denition of classical models. He denes these as follows. Let𝒩 = ∐︀M ,G1,G2, . . . ,
P1, P2, . . .̃︀ be a spacetimemodel of someNewtonian theory. M is a four-dimensional
manifold representing spacetime. G1,G2, . . . are elds dened on it representing
the standard spatiotemporal structures of Galilean spacetime. P1, P2, . . . are elds
representing the material content of the model. One can dene a time function
T ∶ M → R that encodes the simultaneity structure and temporalmetric of themodel.
In terms of𝒩 , Earman denes future-truncated models,𝒩T≤∆, by deleting from the
spacetime manifold of𝒩 all the points p such that T(p) > ∆, −∞ < ∆ < +∞, and
then restricting the geometric and matter elds Gi and Pj of 𝒩 to the truncated
manifold (Earman 2008, p. 139). One can then characterise a model of the Growing
Block view as a pair ℬ = ∐︀N, ≾̃︀. N is a set such that, for some𝒩 , each element is
isomorphic to 𝒩T≤∆ for some ∆. e relation ≾ is dened via the condition that
for any n,n′ ∈N,n ≾ n′ i n can be isomorphically embedded as a submodel of n′.
For ℬ to be an allowed model, ≾ should be a total order. It is to be interpreted as
‘contains at least as much existence as.’
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N, ordered by ≾, thus provides us with a sequence of the kind familiar from our
earlier discussion. In principle, there are two ways of interpreting it as representing
an A-theoretic reality. e ‘standard’ way interprets one of the elements of N as
corresponding to how reality is, absolutely speaking. ‘Earlier’ and ‘later’ elements of
the sequence then represent how reality was and how it will be.e ‘non-standard’
way seeks to interpret each element as a representation of how reality is as of some
time, where the time-relative facts are held to be not further reducible to facts that
hold absolutely.
So much for the Newtonian case. At some level of abstraction, the possible
generalisations to relativistic physics are straightforward. One replaces 𝒩 with
a (non-extendible, orientable) spacetime model ℛ = ∐︀M , gab , P1, P2, . . .̃︀ of some
relativistic theory. Earman then considers two options, which he labels hypersurface
becoming and worldline becoming.
Hypersurface becoming requires thatℛ admit a global time function; a function
t ∶ M → R such that for any p, q ∈ M where p is in the chronological past of q
according to the spacetime metric gab, t(p) < t(q).e construction of a model of
‘hypersurface becoming’ then parallels the Newtonian case. One considers pairs of
the form ℬ(ℛ, t) = ∐︀{ℛt≤δ ∶ l < δ < u}, ≾̃︀. As before,ℛt≤δ is the future-truncated
model one obtains fromℛ be deleting all points p ofM such that t(p) > δ and then
restricting the elds ofℛ to result. l and u are the lower and upper bounds of the
range of t.e relation ≾ is dened via the condition: ℛt≤δ ≾ℛt≤δ′ i δ ≤ δ′.
So far the construction parallels the Newtonian case too closely.e elements
of {ℛt≤δ ∶ l < δ < u} are totally ordered by the relation ≾. As a result, the A theorist
can apply whichever was their preferred interpretation of the classical growing block
model directly to the relativistic model, but they face the thorny issue of which of the
uncountablymany time functions compatible with a given spacetimeℛ corresponds
to the surfaces of real becoming.is is a variant of the (disavowed) second route
to reconciling passage with relativity. We need, instead, to generalise the model to
one that does not single out a preferred family of global Nows.e natural move is
to consider the setR of all possible future-truncations ofℛ associated with every
possible time function on ℛ. We can then dene a relation ≾ on this set in an
obvious way.e required conditions is that, for all r, r′ ∈R, r ≾ r′ i there is some
time function t onℛ such that r is isomorphic toℛt≤δ, r′ is isomorphic toℛt≤δ′ ,
and δ ≤ δ′.31
We now confront an instance of the dening feature of the type of relativistic
models to be considered in the remainder of this paper.e relation ≾ is a partial
order, not a total order. How does this key dierence with the pre-relativistic case
aect the type of interpretation that the A theorist is able to give of the model?
31e result is similar (but not identical) to what Earman calls a ‘super Broad hypersurface
Becoming model’ (Earman 2008, p. 150).
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In the pre-relativistic context there were two options.e standard option takes
a single element of the relevant set as a representation of how reality is absolutely
speaking; the non-standard option treats every element of the set as on a par, each
corresponding to a representation of how reality is relative to some time.
e rst of these looks like a non-starter. Suppose one took an element r ∈R
isomorphic to ℛt≤δ, for some value δ of some time function t, as corresponding
to how reality is absolutely.32is might seem already to give up on our aim of an
A-theoretic view without global Nows. But, so far we only have one global Now, not
a whole sequence, so let us bracket this objection and move on. With this choice of
r as representing the absolute facts, it might seem as if one can straightforwardly
interpret any r′ ≿ r as corresponding to how reality will be. But even this much is
not straightforward, for we have to decide what to say about two elements r1 and
r2 ofR that both correspond to extensions of r but which are not comparable by≾. Can one maintain that reality will be both as r1 represents it as being and as r2
represents it as being? Essentially the same problem becomes far more acute when
one considers elements ofR that are incomparable (according to ≾) with r itself.
Let r′ be such an element that does not include the here and now (which, I assume,
is part of the futuremost boundary of r). r′ cannot represent how things will be
unless the existence of what is happening right here and now can come to cease to
be. But nor can it represent how things were unless something that had come to be
has now come to cease to be.
e moral is that, if one maintains that a unique element ofR corresponds to
how things are absolutely, there does not seem to be an appropriate way to treat all
the other elements of the set. Can non-standard A theory do any better? On such a
view, the problem of what to make of two incomparable elements of theR from the
perspective of a third does not arise (at least ocially), for, on the non-standard
view, one does not look to other elements of the model in order to deduce the tensed
facts that hold relative to a given element. Such facts are supposed to be represented
by the element itself. Even so, the prospects for the view are not much better. One
problem concerns the nature of the perspective relative to which the irreducibly
perspectival facts are supposed to obtain. Spacelike hypersurfaces of relativistic
spacetimes simply are not naturally interpreted as things with respect to which
reality might be a certain way. Our here and now is a subregion of uncountably
many such surfaces if it is a subregion of any.We enjoy a particular spatiotemporal
perspective on reality, but it is not a perspective that naturally extends to any one of
the encompassing hypersurfaces.33
32Presumably one would like the here and now (i.e., your reading this sentence) to be located in a
region of spacetime somewhere on the surface t = δ.
33One of Fine’s own reasons for advocating a version of non-standard A theory is that he believes
that, unlike standard A-theoretic views, it does not need a privileged spacetime foliation (Fine 2005,
305–7). However, his preferred ‘frame-theoretic’ non-standard view still conceives of tense in terms
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A desire to do better justice to the local nature of our spatiotemporal perspective
can be used to motivate the second of Earman’s two options: worldline becoming.
One starts again with an inextentible relativistic spacetime modelℛ.34 One then
considers a past and future endless timelike curve γ inℛ. In now familiar notation,
one can represent a corresponding Growing Block model based on this curve asℬ(ℛ, γ) = ∐︀{ℛJ−(p) ∶ p ∈ γ}, ≾̃︀. ℛJ−(p) is obtained by deleting all the points ofℛ
not in the causal past of the point p and restricting the elds of ℛ to the result.
e relation ≾ is dened via the condition: ℛJ−(p) ≾ ℛJ−(r) i J−(p) ⊆ J−(r). Once
again, the elements of {ℛJ−(p) ∶ p ∈ γ} are totally ordered by the relation ≾. e
properly relativistic model we desire considers all possible worldlines or, more
simply, all points of ℛ. e resulting model is B(ℛ) = ∐︀{ℛJ−(p) ∶ p ∈ M}, ≾̃︀,
with ≾ still dened via ℛJ−(p) ≾ ℛJ−(r) i J−(p) ⊆ J−(r).35 It is a partial order on{ℛJ−(p) ∶ p ∈ M}.
As before, one can consider standard and non-standard A-theoretic interpreta-
tions of this model.e standard variant suers from the problems that aicted the
standard interpretation of the hypersurface-based model. In addition, it displays a
further peculiarity that looks decisively problematic. Suppose one takesℛJ−(p) as
representative of how reality is absolutely. What’s so special about p? Presumably
you hope that p is (roughly speaking) the (i.e., your) here and now. What’s so
special about you? We therefore do better to consider the viability of a non-standard
A-theoretic interpretation. Here we face the general unsuitability of the Growing
Block model as something that might underpin a non-standard view. ℛJ−(p) looks
adequate to representing irreducible past-tensed facts that hold as of spacetime
point p, but what do we want to say about tensed claims, made as of p concerning
the future, or the elsewhere?36 It is hard to avoid looking to other elements of the
model as encoding these, but that way lies many of the problems that plague the
standard interpretation.
IX
e Relativistic Moving Spotlight. Properly relativistic Growing Block models are
not promising materials for the would-be A theorist. Let us turn, instead, to Skow’s
suggested generalisation of the Moving Spotlight view. Skow motivates his proposal
of global spacelike surfaces.e criticisms of this paragraph thus apply to it. ‘Frame-theoretic’ views
also do not generalise naturally to the variably curved spacetimes of general relativity, which lack
the relevant (global) frames.
34One no longer requires thatℛ admit a time function. It is enough for the construction to work
thatℛ be causal-past distinguishing. See Earman (2008, pp. 151-2) for the relevant denitions.
35e model is closely related (though not identical) to what Earman calls a ‘super worldline
becoming model’ (Earman 2008, p. 152).
36e elsewhere of a point in a relativistic spacetime is the set of points spacelike related to it. I.e.,
the set of points neither in nor on either its past or future lightcones.
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via the supertime representation of the pre-relativistic view. e following is a
natural ‘constraint law’ describing how supertime intervals and time intervals should
mesh:
If p and q are points in supertime, and p is r units Later than q, then
the time that is NOW from the perspective of p is r units later than the
time that is NOW from the perspective of q. (Skow 2009, pp. 671–2)
Skow asks how this should be generalised when one replaces Galilean spacetime,
with its unique family of global instants, withMinkowski spacetime. With supertime
still in place, one is aer something of the form:
If p and q are points in supertime, and p is r units Later than q, then
the BLANK-1 from the perspective of p is BLANK-2 than the BLANK-1
from the perspective of q.
Where ‘BLANK-1 holds the place for the kind of region that is “lit up” from perspec-
tives in supertime, and BLANK-2 holds the place for the relation that those regions
stand in’ (Skow 2009, p. 672). As Skow notes, the structure of relativistic spacetimes
provide us with no natural way to ll in these blanks. His ‘solution’ is to replace
the perspectives of the points of supertime with those of the points of ‘Minkowski
superspacetime’. From each such perspective, just one point of ordinary spacetime
is ‘lit up’ as PRESENT. One can then state natural constraint laws, including, for
example:
If p and q are points in superspacetime that are Timelike related, and p
is to the Future of q (that is, lies in the Future Light Cone of q), then
the point that is PRESENT from the perspective of p is timelike related
to and to the future of the point that is PRESENT from the perspective
of q. (Skow 2009, p. 673)
Skow claims that this relativisticmodel vindicates passage, for the relativistic PRESENT
can be said to move just as much as the NOW of the pre-relativistic theory:
Just as, as one moved from Earlier to Later points in supertime, one
saw the NOWmove from earlier to later times, so as one moves from
Earlier to Later points along any Timelike curve in superspacetime,
one will see the PRESENT move from earlier to later points along a
corresponding timelike curve in spacetime. (Skow 2009, p. 675)
At this point, the reader is likely to recall Skow’s insistence, when discussing
the pre-relativistic model, that supertime was just a metaphor. According to the
ocial theory, the perspective of exactly one point in supertime corresponds to the
absolute facts.e perspectives of other points in supertime are representations
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of facts ocially spelled out in terms of primitive tense operators. It is really these
tensed facts, understood as absolute facts, that secure the ‘movement’ of the NOW.
One therefore wants to know: what is the ocial story for which Minkowski super-
spacetime provides a metaphor? Skow declines to answer. Aer speculating that it
might be possible to spell it out in terms of ‘primitive tense-like operators that are
adapted to the structure of relativistic spacetime,’ he excuses himself from doing so
by suggesting that the result would not be worth the eort because ‘the presentation
of the theory using superspacetime is easier to understand’ (Skow 2009, 673–4).
is does not seem adequate.e issue is not whether a story in terms of relativis-
tic tense operators might be more perspicuous than the superspacetime metaphor.
e issue is whether a coherent story in terms of relativistic tense operators can
even be told. Can we maintain that the facts associated with a particular perspective
in superspacetime (however these are to be rendered in terms of relativistic tense
operators) correspond to the absolute facts?e absolute privileging of (not just the
now but) the here and now that this involves seems unacceptable. While it might
be natural to think of ourselves as (momentarily) metaphysically special compared
to the contents of past regions of spacetime, we do not think of ourselves as meta-
physically special compared to, say, the inhabitants of the other side of the Earth.
e non-relativistic A theorist can further play down the lack of egalitarianism by
insisting that past times have been NOW and future times will be NOW. On the
most obvious ways of reconciling tensed claims with relativistic spacetime structure,
the relativistic Moving Spotlighter cannot even claim this of spacetime regions in
our elsewhere.ese never have been and never will be PRESENT.e best one can
say of them is that it will be the case that they have been PRESENT (cf. Putnam
1967, p. 246).37
e supertime metaphor and (presumably) the superspacetime metaphor are
supposed to explicate versions of the Moving Spotlight view conceived of as variants
of standard Aeories that involve absolute (tensed) facts. e diculties just
reviewed suggest that embracing the non-standard route is the relativistic A theorist’s
best option.38 Rather than explore the consequences of this move in the unattractive
framework of the Moving Spotlight, I wish to introduce the natural relativistic
generalisations of the classical branching-time models of passage.
X
Branching Spacetimes and the Passage of Time. Recall the distinction, central to
dierentiating a merely nomologically open future from the notion modelled by
37Primitive ‘spatial’ tenses would provide extra resources to describe the elsewhere, but only at
the risk of introducing an unwanted moving HERE, and the passage space.
38In more recent work, this is also Skow’s view.
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branching-time structures, between facts being undetermined and their being inde-
terminate.is contrast has featured in discussion of the compatibility of becoming
and relativistic physics. Nicholas Maxwell distinguishes what he calls ‘predicative
probabilism’ from ‘ontological probabilism.’e former is essentially the Montague–
Lewis–Earman notion of indeterminism, combined with a unique actual history.
e latter asserts that ‘the basic laws are probabilistic and that the future is now in
reality open with many ontologically real alternative possibilities’ (Maxwell 1985, 25,
original emphasis). It therefore involves a commitment to the open future in the
sense of Section VI. Maxwell’s central contention is that relativity and ontological
probabilism are incompatible. His arguments are the main target of a well-known
paper by Howard Stein (Stein 1991), which defends the viability of a notion of becom-
ing that Stein rst articulated in response to Putnam’s and Rietdijk’s relativity-based
arguments for the block universe (Rietdijk 1966; Putnam 1967; Stein 1968).
In a nutshell, Stein’s relativistic notion of becoming is this: all and only those
events on or in the past lightcone of a spacetime point p have become determinate as
of p (see, e.g., Stein 1968, p. 14). It is might not be evident from this characterisation
alone that Stein is oering something that goes beyond a Dieks-style deationary
notion of becoming.39 However, it is clear elsewhere that Stein takes himself to
be outlining a position that is distinct from the block universe view. For example,
deliberately quoting Maxwell’s terminology, he claims to have argued that ‘special
relativity is perfectly compatible (in general) with “ontological probabilism”’ (Stein
1991, 164). How does the idea that an event has become as of p if and only if it is in
the past lightcone of p achieve this?
On the open-future view of passage of Section VI, to say that an event has
become determinate is to say that it is no longer one of several equally real alternative
possibilities. So, to say that all and only events in the past lightcone have become,
as of some spacetime point p, is to say that, while there is a unique matter of fact
concerning what has occurred in all regions to the past of p, there are (as of p) a
plurality of possibilities open for regions of spacetime to the absolute future of p
and in its elsewhere.is suggests that a rst step towards a relativistic version of the
open-future view of passage should be a relativistic generalisation of branching-time
models to structures that encodes this pattern of relational indeterminacy.
One type of generalisation of branching-time structures has been pioneered
by Nuel Belnap, who calls the result branching space-times.40 Branching-time (BT)
39For example, Stein claims that ‘the leading principle’ that justies the use of ‘becoming’ in a
relativistic setting is: ‘At a space-time point a there can be cognizance of—or information or inuence
propagated from—only such events as occur at points in the past of a’ (Stein 1968, 16).is principle
is one that B theorists can easily accept.
40e seminal work is Belnap (1992), which, incidentally, cites Stein (1991) in its opening remarks.
It exists in a slightly updated form as Belnap (2003). Belnap (2012) contains concise references to
more recent literature.
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models involve a set of global instants (or, better, spatially global, instantaneous
possibilities) partially ordered by a relation <, which one can read as ‘is in the causal
past of.’ Belnap’s generalisation involves replacing global instantaneous possibilities
with possible point events. A branching space-times (BST) model is a set OW
of such possible point events partially ordered by a relation <, which retains the
meaning ‘is in the causal past of.’ (‘OW ’ stands for ‘Our World.’)
In a classical BT model, histories are simply maximal totally ordered subsets
of the model. In contrast, maximal totally ordered subsets of OW are something
like inextendible wordlines: maximal chains of causally-related point events lying
within histories. Since histories can be equated with maximal sets of compatible
events, the key to identifying the histories of a BST model is isolating the relevant
notion of compatibility. In the case of BT models, two events are compatible if they
are part of the same global instant, or are parts of causally related instants. With the
generalisation from instants to point events, we need to allow that distinct events
can be compatible even though they are not comparable by the relation <. Belnap’s
solution is to classify two events as compatible if there is some event which includes
both of them in its past.41 One therefore has a distinction amongst pairs of events
incomparable by < between those that are ‘spacelike related’ (jointly occur in some
histories) and those that are incompatible (jointly occur in no history).e histories
of OW can then be dened asmaximal directed subsets of OW . (A subset E of OW
is directed i, for any elements e1, e2 ∈ E, there is some element e3 of E such that
e1 ≤ e3 and e2 ≤ e3.) One can therefore think of both BT and BST models as certain
kinds of sets of overlapping histories.ey dier in terms of the pattern of overlap.
In the former, histories branch at global instants. In the latter, histories branch at
one or more space-like related point events.
In order to make contact with Stein’s constraint on relativistic becoming, we
need to be able to say when two incompatible possible events count as dierent
possibilities for one and the same location in spacetime. Whether two incompatible
events are collocated is not, in general, dened in Belnap’s BST framework, but it
is something that can be dened for specic classes of models. From here on, my
discussion is implicitly restricted to BST models of this type. In particular, Placek
and Belnap (2012) have recently described a class of BST models the histories of
which are isomorphic to Minkowski spacetime, for which a colocation relation
is easily dened.42 If one considers an element of such a model, i.e., a possible
event e, occurring at some particular spacetime point p, then all the histories in
which e occurs overlap in the past of p. However, for spacetime locations q to the
future or in the elsewhere of p, one will, in general, have two or more incompatible
41is move only works because branching spacetimes theory rules out the possibility of ‘backward
branching’ by at.
42Other examples of ‘Minkowskian Branching Structures’ had previously been constructed by
Müller (2002) and by Wroński and Placek (2009).
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events located at q that share a history with e. In other words, amongst the models
of Belnap’s BST theory, there are structures that would appear to give a precise
expression to the kind of relativistic ‘ontological probabilism’ that Stein seems to
have had in mind.
Relativistic ontological probabilism, however, does not by itself constitute a
relativistic theory of becoming. Recall that the view discussed in Section VI had
two elements: (i) genuine openness that (ii) was settled with the passage of time. So
far we have considered only the relativistic generalisation of (i). Just as classical BT
models have a natural ‘block multiverse’ interpretation, so do BST models. In fact,
it is because of the possibility of such a ‘relativistic block multiverse’ that Everettian
quantum mechanics can evade the troubles that plague other realist interpretations
of quantum theory (such as collapse theories or Bohmian mechanics), and secure a
straightforward reconciliation between quantummechanics and relativity. Whether
or not this essentially B-theoretic interpretation of BST models can underwrite
genuine relational indeterminateness, it no more involves the objective passage of
time than its pre-relativistic analogue. In order to vindicate real temporal passage,
one needs to provide an A-theoretic interpretation of the model according to which,
as time passes, what was indeterminate becomes determinate.
In the classical case, this was achieved by considering the sequence of ever
smaller branching structures that one obtains from a given BT structure,W , by
selecting from it a single history, h. One obtains a unique set of sets of histories inW ,
namely, {H(m) ∶ m ∈ h}, that are totally ordered by the relation of subsethood. (H(m)
labels the set of histories inW that contain instant m.)43 One can do the exactly
parallel thing to a BST model ∐︀OW , <̃︀, i.e., one can consider the set {H(e) ∶ e ∈ h}
dened by some history h in OW .44 As the previous discussion might have led one
to expect, ⊆ is only a partial order on this set. Its elements are natural relativistic
analogues of the elements of a classical branching-time model of passage. Adapting
Earman’s notation, one might write ℬ(OW , h) = ∐︀{H(e) ∶ e ∈ h}, ≾̃︀, where ≾ is
now dened via: H(e) ≾ H(e′) i H(e′) ⊆ H(e).
43is set of histories is not, strictly, a substructure of the original.at is obtained by considering
the union of such a set of histories, structured by the restriction of the original <.
44ere has been surprisingly little discussion of this kind of construction in the context of
branching spacetimes. As far as I am aware, something similar has only been considered by Placek
(2002). S˘varný (2012), for example, in considering whether the ‘ow of time’ can be accommodated
in a range of branching models, including BSTmodels, does not seek to incorporate ‘branch attrition’.
I therefore take his approach to be a variant of the deationary account rejected in Section II.
McCall intended his branch-attrition model of temporal passage to be compatible with relativity
and, in Appendix 2 to McCall (1994), he provides a ‘frame-invariant’ characterisation of a relativistic
branching structure in a manner that owes much to Belnap’s. However, his characterisation of
branch attrition is always in frame-relative terms. How distinct frame-relative descriptions might
be understood as dierent descriptions of a single underlying objective process is not explicitly
addressed.
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Note that variant models can be constructed by choosing dierent types of
subregions in h.e set {H(e) ∶ e ∈ h} embodies the choice of individual spacetime
points as the relativistic heirs to the present.emodel is therefore the BST analogue
of (the generalisation of) Earman’s worldline becoming models, and of Skow’s
relativistic moving spotlight. One could, instead, focus on ‘slices’ of h: maximal
sets of spacelike related events in h.e resulting set of subsets of OW is {H(E) ∶
E is a slice of h}. It too will be partially ordered by the relation of subsethood. It
is a natural analogue of (the generalisation) of Earman’s hypersurface becoming
models.
We can now consider whether such models admit of a plausible A-theoretic
interpretation, and thereby allow for the possibility of time’s really passing in a
relativistic world without global Nows. As before we have two options to consider:
the analogues of the standard and non-standard classical views.e former takes
exactly one element of the model—a set of histories dened in terms of their inclu-
sion of some particular event e—as representative of the absolute facts. In other
words, the facts as of some particular event e are taken as the absolute facts.
e non-relativistic analogue of the view relied on a variant of the presentist
account of passage. In spelling this out, we had to deal with a delicate issue: future
indeterminacy meant that what the absolute facts were going to be could not be
read-o from the (current) absolute facts.erefore a particular choice of ‘future’
elements in the original model was not justied. Ultimately this was not problematic,
because amongst the current facts were facts to the eect that future indeterminacy
was later going to be resolved (one way or another). One can do justice to the idea
that, as time passes, open possibilities are going to be settled without a model that
includes how they are going to be settled.
In order for a similar story to be viable in the context of the relativistic model,
at least two things are required. First, the tensed facts as of a spacetime point, inter-
preted as absolute facts, should underwrite a relativistic analogue of the presentist’s
account of passage. Second, these tensed facts must include facts to the eect that
‘as time passes’ the current openness concerning the future (and the elsewhere) will
be (or will have been) settled one way or the other.
I propose to leave unresolved these intriguing issues because, even if successful
on this front, the view is untenable, for the same reason that the corresponding
interpretations of Earman’s and Skow’s models founder. It is simply not plausible
to take as absolute, facts that correspond to the perspective of a spacetime region
that is both spatially as well as temporally local. I therefore take a non-standard
A-theoretic interpretation of our BST-based models to be the most promising way
to reconcile becoming with relativity. I nish by outlining such a view.
Consider the model ℬ(OW , h) = ∐︀{H(e) ∶ e ∈ h}, ≾̃︀. According to a non-
standard A-theoretic interpretation of this model each element of {H(e) ∶ e ∈ h}
represents the facts that hold as of some spacetime point. H(e), for example, encodes
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the facts that hold as of the spacetime location of the event e. Even though such
facts are the facts that hold as of some spacetime point, they are not supposed to
be reducible to further facts that hold absolutely.ese facts display a particular
pattern of indeterminacy. As of some point p, what happens outside of p’s casual
past is indeterminate. But, as of every point, including all points outside of p’s causal
past, what happens at that point is determinate. Despite not being inter-deducible,
the sets of perspectival facts in this network mesh in the obvious ways. What is
happening at q, as of q, will be among the things that might happen (or might later
have happened) as of points not in the causal future of q.
e model is inequivalent to a single BST model. Facts that are indeterminate
as of earlier points in spacetime are settled as of later points. e model is also
inequivalent to the preferred history it encodes, or to a BST model that includes a
‘thin red line,’ at least as the latter is normally understood. In both of these models,
non-past indeterminate facts are misrepresented as determinate. e particular
pattern of perspective-relative facts that the model encodes cannot be understood as
reducible to a B-theoretic reality corresponding to either a block universe or a block
multiverse. e model therefore constitutes an apparently coherent, thoroughly
relativistic A-theoretic alternative to the Beory.
Does this mean that it vindicates the objective passage of time? In the classical
analogue of themodel, one could trace through a unique, totally ordered sequence of
temporal perspectives, and see facts once open become settled.e spatiotemporal
perspectives of the relativistic model are only partially ordered. One can consider a
maximal totally ordered subset of them, corresponding to a maximal chain of events
in the model’s preferred history. According to such a sequence, the tide of becoming
has the shape of a past lightcone that moves up the privileged worldline. Does some
aspect of such ‘worldline-dependent becoming’ correspond to something objective?
Can one see dierent such sequences obtained from one and the same model as
‘gauge equivalent’? Are they just dierent ways of representing the same underlying
passage of time?
It is standard in cases where gauge equivalence is postulated to demand some
kind of characterisation of the gauge-invariant reality that gauge-related descriptions
dierently represent.e prospects for providing something of this sort look better
if we change the model, from one based on spacetime points, to one based on slices
through our preferred history. Ironically, it is a model involving the analogue of
global spacelike hypersurfaces that best represents local becoming, conceived of as
transition from the indeterminate to the determinate.e reason is that, as one shis
from ‘perspective’ to ‘perspective’ along some maximal totally ordered sequence
of elements from the set {H(E) ∶ E is a slice of h}, the resulting change in what is
determinate is not spread out over a past lightcone, but is spatiotemporally local.45
45For those familiar with them, models of causal set dynamics (see Rideout and Sorkin 1999)might
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Let S1 and S2 be two arbitrary, maximal totally ordered subsets of {H(E) ∶
E is a slice of h}. One might seek to characterise their gauge-invariant content
as follows. Very crudely, maximality ensures that for any event e in h, one can nd
short enough stages of both sequences S1 and S2 where pretty much all that happens
is a transition from e’s potentiality to its actuality. Transitions like this are obvious
candidates for the objective local becoming that both sequences represent. Such
sequences can dier over whether this transition (which is just the occurrence of e)
is ‘before’ or ‘aer’ the becoming denite of some other event spacelike related to e.
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